It is correct that an order was given to withdraw the troops from Avdeevka. It is wrong that it was not given earlier when it became clear that there was a real threat of encirclement. Because of this delay, the withdrawal took place with great difficulty and losses,” a Ukrainian officer told the Ukrainian edition “Strana”.
“Now, two reasons are most often given for what happened – the complete superiority of the Russians in manpower and the complete superiority in weapons. Especially in KAB bombs. But that’s only part of the problem.
In fact, the enemy does not have total superiority in manpower. If taken on average, the Russian advantage in manpower at the front is somewhere around 1:1.5-1.7. But the bad thing is that this ratio changes in favor of the enemy. By late summer 2022, we had a significant manpower advantage. But already in the spring of 2023 there was parity on the front. And since autumn, the Russians have an advantage. And it’s increasing.
The reasons are Ukrainian mobilization problems and losses during the offensive in the summer of 2023.
At the beginning of February at Avdeevka, the Russians had a greater advantage – about four times. But this was a consequence of a number of other factors that played a major role in the fall of the city. The main reason is that the Russians have learned to isolate the battlefield. That is, to destroy our logistics. As a result, our front line units were not getting the required amount of supplies and ammunition. And gradually our forces were exhausted and gaps were formed into which the enemy penetrated.
Of course, this would not be possible without the advantage of the Russians in armaments. Much has already been said about the KAB bombs and their enormous role in inflicting havoc on us. But now the Russians also have a very large ammunition advantage, which cannot always be compensated by the FPV drones, especially since the Russians also have a large amount of drones.
Also important is not only ammunition advantage, but also fire control. The Russians have learned to strike quickly as soon as the target is discovered. Just a year ago, this was not the case. And in general, their tactics and the whole paint management system have changed a lot.
A year ago, everyone was discussing the supposedly breakthrough tactics of the “Wagnerians” – constant waves of attacks by small groups of infantry,
several waves were being destroyed, but eventually the next wave would reach the trenches. In reality, however, it was just a dumb meat grinder – huge sacrifices with minimal results. Prigozhin probably did not care about the losses – he was building a political image for himself, for which he needed to capture Bakhmut at any cost. But thanks to PR, this tactic was then perceived as some kind of know-how. And during the summer offensive in the south, both we and the Russians began to apply it. But very quickly it became clear that it only leads to huge losses. And it’s almost useless.
Therefore, in the fall, our advance stopped. And the Russians, who also suffered heavy losses at Avdeevka, changed their tactics.
They use Storm Z and Storm V units to probe for our weak spots, then throw in strike squads to break through the defenses. There are constant hijacking strikes that stretch our reserves. They use tunnels. At the same time, they are hitting our rear and logistics. We also see a significant improvement in coordination and communication on the part of the adversary. Some attribute this to the appearance of Starlinks with the Russians, others say that they have some developments of their own. But the fact is that now they make decisions much faster and shoot more accurately. And with this tactic, they have fewer casualties than with Bahmut.
All this together changes the situation on the battlefield not in our favor.
It doesn’t change quickly. It’s not like the Russians will be able to break through the front in a day or two. But gradually, week after week, they drain our strength, and eventually the situation can become very bad. Especially if the Russians conduct another wave of mobilization.
How do we counter this? I’m not going to be original here – we need more soldiers, more shells, more drones. And we need to sharply strengthen the front air defense to fight the planes and the KABs. But whether all this is realistic – I don’t know. Arms mobilization and supplies are not at my level of competence,” says the Ukrainian officer.
dir.bg
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