Naser Kandeel
Hezbollah does not hide the existence of a trilogy that controls its calculations on the southern front, the first pillar of which is that it took the step of opening the front to confront the occupation army and that it will exert pressure through it and raise the level of escalation in a way that serves its goals of opening it, and these goals are related to providing support for the battle that the resistance is waging in the Gaza Strip. Whether by exhausting the occupation army with its human and technical capabilities, electronic equipment, and psychological and moral state, or by opening the settler displacement file and putting pressure on the leadership of the entity through it, with a political and security headache that makes thinking about stopping the aggression against Gaza as the obligatory path to recovery from this headache. As for the second pillar, it is ensuring that increasing the rate of fire, the extent of its depth, and the breadth of its targets is linked to adhering to avoiding sliding into a comprehensive war, which the party does not want to go to initially and on its own initiative, and does not see in it as a service to its goals because it considers it a reason to change the direction of world public opinion, whose support for the Palestinian cause is linked. And his uprising against the occupying entity on the condition that Palestine remains a strongly visible title for the war. He also considers that going to this war is a reason for Lebanese and Arab divisions that can be avoided by striving to avoid such a slide. As for the third pillar, it is to maintain the concept of open possibilities, in which going to war becomes an inevitable option, such as the emergence of a threat to the resistance in Gaza, or the occupation committing great foolishness in its handling of the civilian file within this confrontation in a way that requires a response that may be the point of sliding towards higher levels. From war, all the way to the slide into all-out war. This is what can be deduced from the words of the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, about the open possibilities according to monitoring the behavior of the occupying entity towards civilians, and following up on the situation in Gaza, as the party is committed to the resistance emerging victorious from this war.
– With the clarity of the picture on the Hezbollah side, there is a state of loss and confusion on the side of the occupation. The dealing at the beginning of the war with the Lebanon front was to adapt to the level of escalation chosen by Hezbollah under the slogan that the entity’s priority is to achieve victory in Gaza, and to avoid entering into a confrontation. With Hezbollah, performance on the Lebanon front must be governed. Then the approach changed towards seeking to establish a fiery balance that would ensure the survival of the largest number of settlers in the areas of occupied northern Palestine. Whenever it seemed that the Lebanon front had turned into a pressure front on the settlers’ issue, the rhetoric of the entity’s leaders became closer to threatening language, until the headache of the settlers in the north almost became equivalent to the headache of the prisoners in Gaza. Diplomatic initiatives were invented in which the Americans and the French participated, but they never received a deaf ear. Hezbollah has maintained one text, the content of which is that the calm begins in Gaza and the escalation begins in Gaza, but these initiatives and the titles that were uploaded to them were part of the process of buying time with the settlers, in the hope of ending the war in Gaza in a way of victory that would allow the declaration of a cessation of the war. And the return of the settlers, but that did not happen. What happened was the opposite. The war in Gaza, despite the scale of the massacres committed by the occupation army against people and stone, turned into a complete defeat for the occupation army waiting to be recognized.
Two important transformations occurred here. The first was that the hypothesis of concern over the resistance in Gaza declined among Hezbollah as one of the hypotheses of open possibilities. The second was that the leaders of the entity, unable to accept defeat due to the resulting existential challenge to the entity and its ability to stabilize and continue, began to discuss the hypothesis of expanding the war. In a way that it is close to its end, but as a major war, the defeat in Gaza is lost in the heart of international and regional balances surrounding stopping the war when it becomes a major regional war. But meeting the entity’s inclination towards escalation here cannot be met with the opposite, to avoid escalation by retreating, because this will give the entity the opportunity to talk about Victory is an alternative to victory in Gaza, which relieves him of the pressure of admitting defeat in the face of the resistance there, and restores his internal front and his morale from erosion, especially since the escalation is taking place through the gate of increasing the rate of targeting of civilians, and this is the first pillar of the hypothesis of open possibilities, which means that the resistance is concerned with raising the level of Challenge and deterrence, to push the entity’s leaders to reconsider their calculations before getting involved in a war that may not stop at tactical limits that they assume they can control, given that the resistance in Lebanon does not want all-out war. But this exists only in their heads, because if the confrontation turns into this type of war, the resistance will wage it, according to the equation: We do not want war, but we do not fear it, and if it is imposed on us, we will go to it with all our strength to achieve a victory that is equivalent to the amount of sacrifices, because the concept of The resistance to war here coincides with its defensive responsibility to protect Lebanon from the danger of returning to an arena for the entity’s tactical maneuvers, and the response is to raise the cost of war to the point that makes thinking about it impossible, but if war breaks out, there may not be an opportunity to think about it again.
2023-12-27 22:40:24
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