Many misunderstandings about Russia stem from the West’s long-term reluctance to grapple with how Russians see the world. There is a temptation to view the Russian news space as mere propaganda, which is not helped by the tendency to prioritize the thoughts of Moscow liberals over more representative research.
Now, however, some Russian and Ukrainian organizations are trying to engage more actively with Russian public opinion, using a combination of online surveys, search engine results, focus groups and ethnographic approaches to build a more complex picture of what people think. The results of organizations such as Russian Field and Chronicles do not conform to binary stereotypes of all Russians as fascist automatons or repressed Westerners dreaming of a Eurocentric future.
What they increasingly show is a growing concern among Russians about the impact of the war in Ukraine on their personal circumstances.
Most Russians still see their country as a great power
Two polling organizations – the Levada Center and the Open Minds Institute (OMI) – reported respectively that 74% and 79% of Russians are struggling with financial problems caused by the conflict that President Putin started in February last year. Worry about their deteriorating financial situation rose by 18 percentage points between May and September this year, according to the OMI, and that worry affects Russians who support the war and those who oppose it fairly equally. The difference is that the supporters of the war still have a very hopeful view of the future and see these economic problems as temporary, while the opponents of the war do not. Belief in Russian greatness, rather than evidence of current struggles, is the key determinant of optimism, it seems.
For many, this belief is deeply rooted. OMI conducted several online polls on the question of the future of Russia. The latest findings, weighted by age, gender and geography, show that most Russians see their country as an innate great power, entitled to assert its power over other countries. More than 60% believe that Russia will maintain a hegemonic position after President Putin. More than half (53%) believe that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has strengthened its international standing and that other countries will now take Russian demands more seriously. These claims challenge the mainstream Western assumption that the war has exposed the country’s many weaknesses to the populace and shown that Putin is just an emperor without clothes.
The findings make grim reading for anyone hoping to shift Russian support for, or even acceptance of, the war. Anti-war liberal Russians are largely passive and express limited faith in their ability to effect change. In contrast, hawkish Russians report high levels of political activism and tend to dismiss the negative consequences of war as acceptable sacrifices on the way to national self-realization. At the heart of both positions is a lack of imagination about how a different path for Russia might be better or indeed possible. When asked about the qualities of any future leader, most people describe a politician similar to Putin, if a little more caring. It’s as if the concepts of “leader” and Putin have become synonymous.
A deep-seated contempt for the West
There are few Russians of any persuasion inclined to the Western way.
When asked to express their preferences for a post-Putin government, a strong majority chose democracy, but at the same time the “pro-Western” direction was the least desired category – behind even totalitarianism. What may seem paradoxical is perhaps more an expression of the Kremlin’s claim that Russia does have its own kind of democracy and that it is fulfilling the wishes of the Russian people on a global stage. The attitude towards the West is unlikely to improve given the mass exodus of liberals since the start of the war in Ukraine. Moreover, anti-Western beliefs are not just the result of propaganda or ignorance: many Russians simply disagree with Western cultural values, just like many in the West, but also because of resentment rooted in the country’s brutal transition to a market economy in the 1990s years millions impoverished.
Rather than admiring or envying our achievements, there is a widespread contempt for the West that pulses through Russian politics. A common mantra among Russians is that their values are higher, more spiritual and less materialistic and individualistic than Euro-Atlantic values. This is a perception that the Russian Orthodox Church is working hard for.
The Russians are also very concerned about stability. The FSB, the main successor to the KGB, enjoys an even higher rating than the church, behind only the Russian military and Putin himself.
These propaganda-backed institutions have successfully exploited Russians’ sense of superiority, with the Kremlin fueling a social desire for Russia to be feared, envied, and restricted across the globe.
As a result, evidence that Russia may be feared but not respected can sometimes fuel anger and aggression.
Difficulty in changing the minds of civilians
On the battlefield, Russian troops repeatedly face evidence that Russian military superiority is a myth. Their disillusionment or sense of betrayal partly explains the nihilistic brutality unleashed on Ukrainian civilians from Bakhmut to Bucha.
On a recent trip to the borders of Kharkiv and Donetsk regions, in eastern Ukraine, villagers told me numerous stories about Russians deliberately destroying the nicest houses in the neighborhood, as if in revenge for the Kremlin’s lies about Ukrainians’ lower standard of living.
Twenty months after the war began, not that the Russians could not know these truths. Rather, many do not want to accept them because then they will have to do something about it.
Most have access to accurate information. Every day, 60% of the Russian population uses the encrypted social media platform Telegram to monitor news channels. They can read a wide range of opposition and foreign Russian-language media, but the most popular political channels are pro-war.
In Kiev, the head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, General Kyrylo Budanov, expressed his irritation at the many Western commentators who concluded that Ukraine could not win.
He admits that public opinion within his enemy’s borders may still play an important role in the outcome. Few Russians are pro-Western liberals, but most are not genocidal maniacs either. Rather, they are ordinary people, often indifferent to Ukrainian suffering and prone to embrace myths of their own greatness that justify the sacrifices they must make to sustain the war effort.
To change those opinions, you have to change the facts as people experience them.
Online search data shows that Russians are more likely to think critically about the regime or seek out opposition movements when their own loved ones are at risk of conscription.
Ukraine’s brief counter-offensive last year also had an impact: support for the war in Russia declined in response to Moscow’s retreat from Kherson and Kharkiv. This year, hampered by the West’s failure to provide promised F-16s and air defense systems, the Ukrainians have brought the war into the homes of Russians through drone attacks on Russian territory, assassinations and direct micro-targeting of soldiers’ families.
Nestling with excuses for their nation’s failures, Russians can tell themselves that nothing is up to them, everything will be all right in the end, and the people at the top know best. This momentum is the result of the deliberate depoliticization of the Russian public space over the past 20 years, which has worked well for the Kremlin.
Russians think about the victims
Ukraine’s task – and that of its allies – is to shatter this comforting lie by forcing Russians to see the grim reality of what war means to Russians.
This approach seems to be working. A recent survey by the Levada Center shows that almost half (45%) of women are worried about mobilization compared to 18% of men. This unusual disparity may reflect Ukraine’s success in targeting the wives and mothers of serving Russian soldiers on social media to show them how badly their husbands are treated in the military.
Similarly, 91% of Russians express fear of Ukrainian attacks and drone strikes. So far, Putin’s main response has been to abdicate responsibility by putting governors in charge of defending their regions from Ukrainian attacks. Ukrainian drones are stoking anxieties that the Kremlin is unable to quell, leaving Russians feeling vulnerable.
There is no reason to suspect that exposing Russians to the horrors of war will turn them against the myth of Russian greatness. But it may make them think twice before agreeing to die for it, or make them look for other ways to achieve their superiority, in turn putting pressure on the Kremlin, which cannot meet this demand . This will be a long war with an uncertain outcome, but as it turns out, the Ukrainians will not allow the Russians to pretend that this is just a special military operation taking place somewhere else.
The commentary is by Jade McGlynn, author of The Memory Makers: The Politics of the Past in Putin’s Russia, for The Times.
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2023-10-15 13:55:00
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