There is a whole network of tunnels under the Gaza Strip, through which Hamas can move weapons, rockets and militants. That network is now the target of the Israeli army. But can it ever turn that off completely?
The Gaza Strip is only 41 kilometers long and a maximum of 12 kilometers wide, but underground there is a tunnel network that covers about 480 kilometers. At least that is what the Israeli army estimates, which is now targeting the network with air strikes. The aim of the offensive against Hamas is to ensure that the terrorist movement “no longer has any military capabilities” by the end of the war, army spokesman Jonathan Conricus told CNN.
Hamas released a propaganda video that should show the importance of the tunnels in the raids of recent days. Black-clad fighters underground deliver the rockets that are fired at Israel. For Hamas, the tunnels are the answer to the military superiority of the Israeli army. Combatants can move and hide underground unnoticed.
When Israeli ground forces enter Gaza, the tunnels also form the main defense belt. “In a sense, Gaza has two layers,” says Jeroen Gunning, who researches Hamas at King’s College London. “One layer above the ground and one below. That makes it very difficult for the Israeli army. The tunnels allow Hamas fighters to appear seemingly out of nowhere and carry out attacks.”
Auto’s
Analysts now agree that most tunnels under Gaza are for military use, but that was not always the case. In the past, they have also proven to be a lifeline for the Palestinian population to bring in goods. In this way, the Gazans were able to undermine the economic blockade that Israel and Egypt have imposed since 2007.
Since the blockade, the Israeli navy has prevented ships from delivering to Gaza and all land border crossings have been closed. “Certainly in the first years of the blockade, the Palestinians dug tunnels under the border to Egypt,” says Gunning. “This way they could bring in food but also even cars. The Egyptian government subsequently took action against those border tunnels and filled them with water.”
But that does not mean that all tunnels between Egypt and Gaza are now closed. It is always said among experts that at least one tunnel opens in Gaza for every passage that is closed. It would also explain how Hamas gets hold of Iranian missiles, which probably first travel along the Red Sea and then are transported through the Sinai desert.
The desert sand makes it not that difficult to dig in that spot. Even with simple tools you can get through the soft surface, but the sand has also proven treacherous. “Tunnels have already collapsed, causing people to be buried by the sand and die,” Gunning said. “Tunnels dug by Hamas in Gaza generally use heavy equipment and the walls are propped up with concrete.”
Both Hamas and the Israeli army have given journalists a glimpse into the underground complexes in the past. Most tunnels would be one meter wide and about 2.5 meters high. They would reach a depth of between 30 and 40 meters, making them easy for fighters to move around and safe from aerial bombardment.
‘Defensive’ tunnels have been constructed with weapons caches and underground headquarters, from which Hamas can wage a defensive war. According to analysts, these defensive tunnels are linked to ‘offensive’ ones, with which it can send fighters across the border with Israel unnoticed.
The wall that Israel built around Gaza is intended to stop tunnels. That is why the wall goes several meters into the ground and sensors have been installed that can detect underground construction activity. But that protection appears not to be waterproof.
Bunker buster
To tackle the underground networks, the Israeli air force uses special bombs, the so-called ‘bunker busters’. There are roughly two types: some bunker bombs have a reinforced nose so that the bomb penetrates the surface and then explodes underground. Other bombs have two charges: the first makes a hole, the second blows apart a structure from within.
Because the explosive charges of such bunker bombs are extremely heavy, there is always a high risk of collateral damage. Civilians living nearby could die from the explosions. Because analysts believe that the approximately 150 Hamas hostages are also in tunnels, the Israeli army will have to act particularly carefully.
Gunning doubts whether the Israeli army will succeed in neutralizing all tunnels, which has not been possible in previous ground operations. These offensives always exacted a high toll in civilian casualties and fallen militants. “In 2014 they took out a lot of the tunnels, but not all of them,” says Gunning. “It was precisely because of this tunnel warfare that the Israeli offensive was stopped.”
