The Increasing Threat of Displacement in Lebanon: Economic, Security, and Demographic Challenges

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At the height of talk about the necessity of addressing the issue of displaced Syrians, whose number exceeded Lebanon’s ability to absorb them in various aspects, especially economic ones, the new wave of displacement came to double the crisis, this time in both its economic and security aspects, with the latter taking the lead strongly, after there was much talk about the coming security threat. As a matter of displacement, in light of the situation of a country threatened by chaos every day and from various angles…

It is true that the recent wave of Syrian displacement was dangerous in all respects, but that does not negate the fact that the threat of displacement began in 2011, according to sources following the file, that is, at the moment when some Lebanese parties tried to exploit the influx of the first batches to the Arsal region to use their presence in a better way. The Syrian regime and the resistance, and considering their embrace as a humanitarian act that requires sacrifice and media marketing that they are fleeing from the oppression of the regime and not from the crimes of the Takfiris, and this is what established the first camp to establish camps in which the Takfiris took shelter to carry out their terrorist operations against the army and security forces, kidnap soldiers, and send car bombs. This means that the delegations The politician who visited Arsal and worked on the presence of the displaced was a partner in preventing official institutions from organizing the presence of these people on Lebanese territory. This was the beginning, and this is considered the first in a series of things that led to where we are today.

The second thing, which was remarkable, was the emergence of many civil society associations concerned with providing, dividing, or trading in aid in the first years of the Syrian crisis. The third thing is the enthusiasm of international organizations to directly address the operations of statistics, administration, and care, and to provide aid without referring to the official institutions and ministries concerned.

Here it must be recognized that any treatment of the issue of displacement in the future must take into account the three previous observations, according to the sources, because they all indicate the presence of internal and international parties that were and are still using the displaced as political pressure cards and blackmail, whether for the Syrian regime or the resistance in Lebanon. This is confirmed by the public statements of officials at the United Nations, the European Commission, and the US State Department, which considered the return of the displaced to be linked to the fate of the regime and not to humanitarian considerations. They moved from the goal of overthrowing the regime, which they failed to achieve, to weakening it.

What is new in this file, the sources add, is the increasing numbers of displaced people and the increasing talk about the demographic change that Lebanon is witnessing in some of its governorates and districts, where the percentage of Syrians in some areas has reached more than twice the number of the Lebanese population.

Regardless of the motives that called on the Syrians to settle in Lebanon, the donors’ requirement to allocate a number of schools (350 schools) for 70,000 Syrian students, and linking that to the aid they provide to the Ministry of Education, raises major question marks about the intentions of these parties regarding the fate of the displaced, especially since they It intervenes in the programmes, the number of teachers and their nationalities, and requests the allocation of a percentage of teachers who hold Syrian nationality and thus secure job opportunities for them to devote their stay in Lebanon.

The most dangerous matter is what the security services recently uncovered of weapons and explosive materials in some of the camps they raided, as well as the discovery of a large number of Syrian youth coming through smuggling who are inside these camps, in addition to the increasing activity of smuggling gangs on the border, thefts, kidnappings, and drug trafficking. , in which displaced Syrians participate.

The question here is: Are we facing security risks in addition to demographic, economic and social risks? The sources answer that all of the above leads us to be extremely wary of the intention of international and regional intelligence services to organize and form groups of displaced Syrians within the framework of trained militias, to be used in security operations whose primary pretext may be to protect the camps for the displaced from the increasing objections to their presence, and this prevents many from Parties and leaders avoid appearing to directly oppose their presence, as the external security agencies that may use them are waiting for any negative stance from the resistance environment in particular, to incite the armed groups and portray the matter as a conflict between the resistance and displaced Syrians. This does not negate Hezbollah’s responsibility to monitor and follow up on this type of eventuality in cooperation with the Lebanese security services, because this part of the risks is shared by the resistance with the state to preserve the security of the home front, preserve civil peace, and prevent strife, because the “Israeli” who suffer from weakness in His internal front, he is actively working to weaken or at least confuse the internal front of the resistance.

Here, it is no secret to anyone that the weak point in the confrontation lies in the weak official performance that does not rise to the level of the problem. Until this moment, the political decision has not been taken to confront what is being simulated in Lebanon through the displaced, and which is being translated on the Syrian-Lebanese border, so that “ironically” the Lebanese army It cannot fully control land borders, but it can control maritime borders.

Since the decision was not taken at the general official level, field procedures are carried out at the municipal level, which took place in coordination between Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement to manage and organize the Syrian presence, housing and employment, and apply specific conditions and restrictions to prevent the random spread of the displaced.

In light of this scene, it is natural that all local measures will not be sufficient if the Lebanese state does not take a sovereign decision to address these risks:

– First: Through direct communication with the Syrian state.

– Second: Controlling the work of associations supported from abroad.

– Third: The state imposes controls on international institutions’ management of displaced persons’ affairs as a first step, until it has the ability to confront.

Fourth: Informing international bodies about lifting the state’s responsibility for controlling maritime borders and demanding compensation, not for the survival of the displaced, but compensation for the effects of the displacement organized by them on Lebanon in all its aspects, specifically the economic ones.

But all of this requires an official Lebanese decision in the confrontation. Can any state official take it, or will their weakness of will continue to control their performance, as is usual? Are there other options before Lebanon, such as those that usually emerge when the state abandons its responsibilities and shows its inability every time Lebanon is threatened by an existential threat?

2023-10-02 21:01:27
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