As Japan prepares to host the 2023 Rugby World Cup and the 2028 Summer Olympics, the country’s role in the region is under scrutiny. In a changing geopolitical landscape, Japan has been recalibrating its approach to regional security, increasing its defense spending, and forming new alliances. In a recent article by Joseph Chinyong Liow and William Choong, researchers at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, they explore the implications of Japan’s evolving role in regional security and the reactions from neighboring countries. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the challenges and opportunities facing Japan as it navigates these shifting dynamics in the years ahead.
Japan, once known for its pacifist stance, has been making significant strides in recalibrating its security and defence policy in response to changes in the strategic environment. The country, which has historically been cautious about involvement in foreign and security affairs, began to shift its perspective in the past few decades. This shift picked up steam under former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who spearheaded the 2015 reinterpretation of the Constitution, allowing the Japan Self-Defense Forces to join in collective self-defence missions. Recent survey data show that there has been greater receptivity to the view that Japan’s national defence capacity needs to be enhanced, given the changing security environment.
Japan’s journey towards normalisation as a typical military power has had a few notable milestones. In 1959, Japan’s Supreme Court established that the Constitution did not prohibit the country’s acting in self-defence. Revised guidelines for US-Japan defence cooperation in 1997 stated that Japan could provide logistical and non-combat support to the US. Japan also elevated the Japan Defense Agency to become a full-fledged ministry in 2006, which gave defence officials greater control in national policymaking and decisions over the budget. In 2019, Japan revealed that its largest warships, the Izumo-class helicopter destroyers, would be retrofitted to carry F-35B fighters, which made the vessels in all senses and purposes light aircraft carriers – power projection tools that have long been the preserve of bigger military powers.
On 16 December 2022, Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida unveiled the National Security Strategy, the National Defence Strategy, and the Defence Build-up Program. These three documents collectively articulated the strategic outlook of Japan for the coming years and outlined commensurate defence postures and policies. They also signalled a shift away from reliance on US security guarantees as the first line of defence towards greater self-reliance predicated on a realisation that Japan needed to assume “primary responsibility” for its own security. Under these documents, Japan would enhance its capability to perform this task through the acquisition of counterstrike missile capabilities, implying a conflation of the concepts of self-defence and pre-empting potential threats around Japan’s periphery.
This recent recalibration of Japan’s security and defence policy was at least in part enabled by changes in the constellation of domestic politics. The last general election in Japan, held in October 2021, saw the Liberal Democratic Party win a resounding majority in the Lower House, paving the way for the LDP and Prime Minister Kishida to have a freer hand on standing committees and, by extension, greater influence in policy discussions leading up to the formulation of the new strategic documents.
However, despite the increasing receptivity of the Japanese public to a more engaged and proactive Japan in building a durable regional order, there are still risks involved. Japan’s efforts to forge a durable regional order may be met with opposition from those neighbours who may view this development with suspicion due to Japan’s past aggressive activities. Moreover, Japan’s engagement may not always align with the interests of its neighbours, particularly with respect to the Taiwan Strait, where Japan’s own interests may lead it to oppose steps taken by China towards reunification.
Japan’s proactive security policy in the region is therefore not without challenges. However, it is clear that Japan’s shift towards a more normalised military power has been a gradual one, fuelled by changes in the strategic environment and a rethinking of the country’s role in regional affairs. As Japan takes on a more proactive role as a security provider in the region, it will have to tread carefully, maintaining positive relations with its neighbours while aligning its own interests with regional stability and security.
