Although the rank of the visit was far from being the highest, it immediately attracted a lot of attention for several reasons.
Firstly, Nuland is considered one of the two main experts on Russia in the current US administration due to his previous experience (the other is William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose current position is not particularly suitable for diplomatic negotiations), and secondly, he is well known for his participation in the 2014 events in Ukraine. In addition, Nulanda was on the list of US officials subject to Russian sanctions, and before her trip to Moscow, there were lengthy talks about the conditions under which Nulanda would be allowed to enter Russia.
Due to these and other nuances of Nuland’s biography, the trip to Moscow received disproportionate attention, including many speculations that the official had come to Russia either to “sell” Ukraine or to unswervingly defend Kiev from Moscow’s aggression. The issue of Ukraine was, of course, not the last in the talks, but the main goal was to make diplomatic preparations before the preliminary meeting between US President Joe Biden and Russian leader Vladimir Putin in December this year. A Russian diplomat of an equivalent rank went to the United States with the same goal, however, the information about this visit attracted almost no attention.
What agreements were or were not reached on the short and vague official statements, meanwhile, is not clear, which is also logical. The agenda for the presidential meeting is still being agreed. Priority will be given to the re-establishment of US-Russia diplomatic relations, albeit to a mutually acceptable level, climate issues and possible agreements on the control of strategic armaments on both sides. The main goal of US diplomacy is another – to achieve at least neutrality from Russia in the growing geopolitical conflict between the United States and China.
It is Beijing that Washington has been recognized as the main geopolitical opponent of the United States, and all possible forces, resources and allies are being mobilized to limit it. At the same time, it is clear that the current mobilization is not enough, and the outcome of the confrontation will depend on Washington’s success in India’s accession to the so-called Alliance of Democracies (but India is diligently avoiding this possibility) and Russia’s position.
Moscow does not have any desire to renounce special relations with Beijing in the meantime, although at the same time it does not rule out the possibility that such a wish may not arise in the distant future. Of course, if an appropriate price is offered in the form of redrawing areas of influence, which is an openly frightening prospect for at least part of Eastern Europe.
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